This note reanalyzes a non·zero-sum game version of the secretary problem recently treated by Kurano, Nakagami and Yasuda [3], under a modified formulation of the problem. The equilibrium derived differs from the former one and has an interesting assymptotic behavior which reconfirms a main theorem formerly proved by Presman and Sonin [4] . Th" equilibrium value in the limit is a positive number which is a unique root in (0, 1/2) of a transcendental equation.
1_ Introduction and Purpose
In their paper [3 J, Kurano , Nakag8lTIi and Yasuda analysed a two-person game version of thE· so-called secretary problem in which the situation can be represented aE follows: There are two competitors and two identical sets of N applicants, and each player considers his set in the conditions of the "ellknown secretary problem, taking decisions independently of the other player_ As soon as one of the players stops, the other player is informed of this information and he drops out of the g8lTIe _ The goal of each player is to maximize the probability of win, Le. stopping at the best one in his set of objeets.
In [3J the authors give a non-zero-sum game formulation and shows that the unique Nash-equibilium strategy for each player has a threshold character, i.e. each player must stop at the arrival of the first candidate (the obj ect which is best among those preceding it) positive integer satisfying m*NIl j=r.* after the m*-th, where m* is the smalle:,t -2 that the Nash-equilibrium si;rategy, which gives an interesting asymptotic result, is obtained under a modified setting of the game. Next we illustrate, for purposes of comparison, with the solutions of other related problems as well as the one in [3] . It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the simplest form of the secretary problem and its solution (see,~, Gilbert and
Mosteller [2] ).
A Non-Zero-Sum Game Related to the Secretary Problem
We first state the problem as follows: (1) There are two competitors and two identical sets of N objects, and each player considers his set in the conditions of the well-knoWI. secretary problem, taking decisions (i. e. continue or stop observing) independently of the other player. (2) If one of the players stops, the other player is ~ot informed of this fact and continues playing. We call a "win" for each player the event in which he gets to be the first to stop at the best one in his set of objects. If the two player stop simultaneously at the best one in each player's set of objects, both of them are the winners.
(3)The goal of each player in the game is to maximize the probability that he becomes a single winner.
A strategy which prescribes stopping at the first candidate that appears (if any) after the m-th will be called m-level strategy and will be denoted by om' The importance of the m-level strategies for a class of the secretary problems we are discussing about is widely known (see, ~ Presman and Sonin [4] , Gaver [1] , and Smith [5J). l .
since the probability that the j-th is the first candidate after the ml-th is 
Games Related to the Secretary Problem
and differentiation shows that thel'e e;x:ists a unique equilibrium point x* y* arid the equilibrium value is equal to zero, Since there remains no I,ossibility of a win for a player if the other player has stopped earlier ttan him, both of the players compete with the opponent in making the earliEst stop, and thus the consequence is the above non-interesting behavior. and y, replaced by Tl and T 2 , respectively, so that we again have the pair of payoff functions (2.5)-(2.6), for the non-zero-sum game we have considered.
Similar analysis as made in

